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1 Introduction
Suppose the dynamics of a state process X(t) = X(u0,u1)(t, ω); t ≥ 0, ω ∈ Ω, is a controlled
Itoˆ-Le´vy process in R of the form
(1.1)

dX(t) = b(t,X(t), u0(t), ω)dt+ σ(t,X(t), u0(t), ω)dB(t)
+
∫
R0 γ(t,X(t
−), u0(t−), u1(t−, z), z, ω)N˜(dt, dz);
X(0) = x ∈ R.
where the coefficients b : [0, T ] × R × U × Ω → R, σ : [0, T ] × R × U × Ω → R and
γ : [0, T ]×R×U ×K ×R0 ×Ω are given Ft-predictable processes and U,K are given open
convex subsets of R2 and R × R0 respectively. Here R0 = R − {0}, B(t) = B(t, ω), and
η(t) = η(t, ω), given by
η(t) =
∫ t
0
∫
R0
zN˜(ds, dz); t ≥ 0, ω ∈ Ω,(1.2)
are a 1-dimensional Brownian motion and an independent pure jump Le´vy martingale, re-
spectively, on a given filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0, P ). Thus
(1.3) N˜(dt, dz) := N(dt, dz)− ν(dz)dt
is the compensated Poisson jump measure of η(·), where N(dt, dz) is the Poisson jump
measure and ν(dz) is the Le´vy measure of the pure jump Le´vy process η(·). For simplicity,
we assume that ∫
R0
z2ν(dz) <∞.(1.4)
The processes u0(t) and u1(t, z) are the control processes and have values in a given open
convex set U and K respectively for a.a. t ∈ [0, T ], z ∈ R0 for a given fixed T > 0. Also,
u0(·) and u1(·) are ca`dla`g and adapted to a given filtration {Et}t≥0, where
Et ⊆ Ft, t ∈ [0, T ].
{Et}t≥0 represents the information available to the controller at time t. For example, we
could have
Et = F(t−δ)+ ; t ∈ [0, T ], δ > 0 is a constant,
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meaning that the controller gets a delayed information compared to Ft. We refer to [YZ]
and [ØS] for more information about stochastic control of Itoˆ diffusions and jump diffusions,
respectively.
Let f : [0, T ] × R × U × K × Ω → R and g : R × Ω → R are given F-adapted stochastic
processes. Suppose there are two players in the stochastic differential game and the given
performance functionals for players are as follows:
Ji(u0, u1) = E
x
[ ∫ T
0
∫
R0
fi(t,X(t), u0(t), u1(t, z), z, ω)µ(dz)dt+ gi(X(T ), ω)
]
, i = 1, 2,
where µ is a measure on the given measurable space (Ω,F) and Ex = ExP denotes the
expectation with respect to P given that X(0) = x. Suppose that the controls u0(t) and
u1(t, z) have the form
(1.5) u0(t) = (pi0(t), θ0(t)); t ∈ [0, T ]
(1.6) u1(t, z) = (pi1(t, z), θ1(t, z)); (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R0.
Let AΠ and AΘ denote the given family of controls pi = (pi0, pi1) and θ = (θ0, θ1) such that
they are contained in the set of Et-adapted controls, (1.1) has a unique strong solution up
to time T and
Ex
[ ∫ T
0
∫
R0
|fi(t,X(t), pi0(t), pi1(t, z), θ0(t), θ1(t, z), z, ω)|µ(dz)dt+|gi(X(T ), ω)|
]
<∞, i = 1, 2.
The partial information non-zero-sum stochastic differential game problem we consider is
the following:
Problem 1.1 Find (pi∗, θ∗) ∈ AΠ ×AΘ (if it exists) such that
(i) J1(pi, θ
∗) ≤ J1(pi∗, θ∗) for all pi ∈ AΠ
(ii) J2(pi
∗, θ) ≤ J2(pi∗, θ∗) for all θ ∈ AΘ.
Such a control (pi∗, θ∗) is called a Nash Equilibrium (if it exists). The intuitive idea is that
there are two players, Player I and Player II. While Player I controls pi, Player II controls θ.
Each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player
has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy (i.e., by changing unilaterally).
Player I and Player II are in Nash Equilibrium if each player is making the best decision
she can, taking into the account of the other player’s decision. Note that since we allow
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b, σ, γ, f and g to be stochastic processes and also because our controls are Et−adapted, this
problem is not of Markovian type and hence cannot be solved by dynamic programming.
Our paper is related to the recent paper [AØ] and [MØZ], where a maximum principle
for stochastic differential games with partial information and maximum principle are deal
with respectively. However, in [AØ] the existence of a solution of the adjoint equations is
assumed. This is an assumption which often fails in the partial information case. We handle
this problem by using Malliavin calculus techniques. We use Malliavin calculus to obtain a
maximum principle for this general non-Markovian stochastic differential game with partial
information.
2 A brief review of Malliavin calculus for Le´vy pro-
cesses
In this section, first we recall the basic definition and properties of Malliavin calculus for
the space of functionals of Gaussian space. Second, we recall some fundamental properties
and definitions of Malliavin calculus for Le´vy processes related to this paper, for reader’s
convenience. For further information about Malliavin calculus, see [N], [BDLØP] and [DØP].
According to the Le´vy–Itoˆ decomposition theorem, any Le´vy process Y (t) with
E[Y 2(t)] <∞ for all t
can be written
Y (t) = at+ bB(t) +
∫ t
0
∫
R0
zN˜(ds, dz)
with constants a and b, so it suffices to deal with Malliavin calculus for B(·) and for
η(·) :=
∫
0
∫
R0
zN˜(ds, dz)
separately.
2.1 Malliavin calculus for B(·)
A natural starting point is the Wiener-Itoˆ chaos expansion theorem, which states that any
F ∈ L2(FT , P ) can be written
F =
∞∑
n=0
In(fn)(2.1)
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for a unique sequence of symmetric deterministic functions fn ∈ L2(λn), where λ is Lebesgue
measure on [0, T ] and
In(fn) = n!
∫ T
0
∫ tn
0
· · ·
∫ t2
0
fn(t1, · · · , tn)dB(t1)dB(t2) · · · dB(tn)(2.2)
(the n-times iterated integral of fn with respect to B(·)) for n = 1, 2, . . . and I0(f0) = f0
when f0 is a constant.
Moreover, we have the isometry
(2.3) E[F 2] = ||F ||2L2(p) =
∞∑
n=0
n!||fn||2L2(λn).
Definition 2.1
Let D (B)1,2 be the space of all F ∈ L2(FT , P ) such that its chaos expansion (2.1) satisfies
||F ||2
D
(B)
1,2
:=
∞∑
n=1
nn!||fn||2L2(λn) <∞.(2.4)
For F ∈ D (B)1,2 and t ∈ [0, T ], we define the Malliavin derivative of F at t with respect to
B(·), DtF, by
DtF =
∞∑
n=1
nIn−1(fn(·, t)),(2.5)
where In−1(fn(·, t)) is the (n − 1)-times iterated Itoˆ integral to the first n − 1 variables of
fn(t1, t2, · · · , tn) and keep the last variable tn = t as a parameter.
One can easily check that
E
[ ∫ T
0
(DtF )
2dt
]
=
∞∑
n=1
nn!||fn||2L2(λn) = ||F ||2D(B)1,2 ,(2.6)
so if F ∈ D (B)1,2 , then (t, ω)→ DtF (ω) belongs to L2(λ× P ).
Example 2.2 If F =
∫ T
0
f(t)dB(t) with f ∈ L2(λ) deterministic, then
DtF = f(t) for a.a. t ∈ [0, T ].
More generally, if u(s) is Skorohod integrable, u(s) ∈ D1,2 for a.a. s and Dtu(s) is Skorohod
integrable for a.a. t, then
(2.7) Dt
(∫ T
0
u(s)δB(s)
)
=
∫ T
0
Dtu(s)δB(s) + u(t) for a.a. (t, ω),
where
∫ T
0
ψ(s)δB(s) denotes the Skorohod integral of ψ with respect to B(·). (See [N], page
35–38 for a definition of Skorohod integrals and for more details.)
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Some other basic properties of the Malliavin derivative Dt are the following:
(i) Chain rule ([N], page 29)
Suppose F1, . . . , Fm ∈ D (B)1,2 and that ψ : Rm → R is C1 with bounded partial deriva-
tives. Then ψ(F1, · · · , Fm) ∈ D1,2 and
Dtψ(F1, · · · , Fm) =
m∑
i=1
∂ψ
∂xi
(F1, · · · , Fm)DtFi.(2.8)
(ii) Integration by parts/duality formula ([N], page 35)
Suppose u(t) is Ft−adapted with E[
∫ T
0
u2(t)dt] <∞ and let F ∈ D (B)1,2 . Then
E[F
∫ T
0
u(t)dB(t)] = E[
∫ T
0
u(t)DtFdt].(2.9)
2.2 Malliavin calculus for N˜(·)
The construction of a stochastic derivative/Malliavin derivative in the pure jump martingale
case is similar to the Brownian motion case. In this case the corresponding Wiener-Itoˆ chaos
expansion theorem states that any F ∈ L2(FT , P ) (where in this case Ft = F (N˜)t is the
σ−algebra generated by η(s) := ∫ s
0
∫
R0 zN˜(dr, dz); 0 ≤ s ≤ t) can be written as
F =
∞∑
n=0
In(fn); fn ∈ Lˆ2((λ× ν)n),(2.10)
where Lˆ2((λ × ν)n) is the space of functions fn(t1, z1, . . . , tn, zn); ti ∈ [0, T ], zi ∈ R0
such that fn ∈ L2((λ × ν)n) and fn is symmetric with respect to the pairs of variables
(t1, z1), . . . , (tn, zn). It is important to note that in this case the n−times iterated integral
In(fn) is taken with respect to N˜(dt, dz) and not with respect to dη(t). Thus, we define
(2.11) In(fn) = n!
∫ T
0
∫
R0
∫ tn
0
∫
R0
· · ·
∫ t2
0
∫
R0
fn(t1, z1, · · · , tn, zn)N˜(dt1, dz1) · · · N˜(dtn, dzn)
for fn ∈ Lˆ2((λ× ν)n).
The Itoˆ isometry for stochastic integrals with respect to N˜(dt, dz) then gives the following
isometry for the chaos expansion:
||F ||2L2(P ) =
∞∑
n=0
n!||fn||2L2((λ×ν)n).(2.12)
As in the Brownian motion case we use the chaos expansion to define the Malliavin derivative.
Note that in this case there are two parameters t, z, where t represents time and z 6= 0
represents a generic jump size.
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Definition 2.3 (Malliavin derivative Dt,z) [BDLØP], [DMØP], [DØP] Let D
(N˜)
1,2 be the
space of all F ∈ L2(FT , P ) such that its chaos expansion (2.10) satisfies
||F ||2
D
(N˜)
1,2
:=
∞∑
n=1
nn!||fn||2L2((λ×ν)2) <∞.(2.13)
For F ∈ D (N˜)1,2 , we define the Malliavin derivative of F at (t, z) (with respect to ˜N(·)), Dt,zF,
by
Dt,zF =
∞∑
n=1
nIn−1(fn(·, t, z)),(2.14)
where In−1(fn(·, t, z)) means that we perform the (n−1)−times iterated integral with respect
to N˜ to the first n − 1 variable pairs (t1, z1), · · · , (tn, zn), keeping (tn, zn) = (t, z) as a
parameter.
In this case we get the isometry.
E[
∫ T
0
∫
R0
(Dt,zF )
2ν(dz)dt] =
∞∑
n=0
nn!||fn||2L2((λ×ν)n) = ||F ||2D(N˜)1,2 .(2.15)
(Compare with (2.6).)
Example 2.4 If F =
∫ T
0
∫
R0 f(t, z)N˜(dt, dz) for some deterministic f(t, z) ∈ L2(λ×ν), then
Dt,zF = f(t, z) for a.a. (t, z).
More generally, if ψ(s, ζ) is Skorohod integrable with respect to N˜(δs, dζ), ψ(s, ζ) ∈ D (N˜)1,2
for a.a. s, ζ and Dt,zψ(s, ξ) is Skorohod integrable for a.a. (t, z), then
(2.16) Dt,z(
∫ T
0
∫
R
ψ(s, ζ)N˜(δs, dζ)) =
∫ T
0
∫
R
Dt,zψ(s, ζ)N˜(δs, dζ) + u(t, z) for a.a. t, z,
where
∫ T
0
∫
R ψ(s, ζ)N˜(δs, dζ) denotes the Kabanov-Skorohod integral of ψ with respect to
N˜(·, ·). (See [DØP] for a definition of such Skorohod integrals and for more details.)
The properties of Dt,z corresponding to the properties (2.8) and (2.9) of Dt are the
following:
(i) Chain rule ([DØP]) Suppose F1, · · · , Fm ∈ D (N˜)1,2 and that φ : Rm → R is contin-
uous and bounded. Then φ(F1, · · · , Fm) ∈ D (N˜)1,2 and
(2.17) Dt,zφ(F1, · · · , Fm) = φ(F1 +Dt,zF1, . . . , Fm +Dt,zFm)− φ(F1, . . . , Fm).
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(ii) Integration by parts/duality formula [DØP] Suppose Ψ(t, z) is Ft-adapted and
E[
∫ T
0
∫
R0 ψ
2(t, z)ν(dz)dt] <∞ and let F ∈ D (N˜)1,2 . Then
E
[
F
∫ T
0
∫
R0
Ψ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
R0
Ψ(t, z)Dt,zFν(dz)dt
]
.(2.18)
3 The general maximum principle for the stochastic
differential games
We now return to Problem 1.1 given in the introduction. We make the following assumptions:
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Assumption 3.1
(3.1) The functions b : [0, T ]×R×U ×Ω→ R, σ : [0, T ]×R×U ×Ω→ R, γ : [0, T ]×R×
U ×K ×R0×Ω→ R, fi : [0, T ]×R×U ×K ×Ω→ R and gi : R×Ω→ R for i = 1, 2
are all continuously differentiable (C1) with respect to x ∈ R and u0 ∈ U , u1 ∈ K for
each t ∈ [0, T ] and a.a. ω ∈ Ω.
(3.2) For all s, r, t ∈ (0, T ), t ≤ r, and all bounded Et−measurable random variables α =
α(ω), ξ = ξ(ω) the controls βα(s) := (0, β
i
α(s)) and ηξ(s) := (0, η
i
ξ) for i = 1, 2 with
βiα(s) = α
i(ω)χ[t,r](s); s ∈ [0, T ]
and
ηiξ(s) = ξ
i(ω)χ[t,r](s); s ∈ [0, T ]
belong to AΠ and AΘ respectively. Also, we will denote the transposed of the vectors
β and η by β∗, η∗ respectively.
(3.3) For all pi, β ∈ AΠ with bounded β , there exists δ > 0 such that
pi + yβ ∈ AΠ for all y ∈ (−δ, δ)
and such that the family{∂f1
∂x
(t,X(pi+yβ,θ)(t), pi + yβ, θ, z)
d
dy
X(pi+yβ,θ)(t)
+∇pif1(t,X(pi+yβ,θ)(t), pi + yβ, θ, z)β∗(t)
}
y∈(−δ,δ)
is λ× ν × P -uniformly integrable and the family{
g′1(X
pi+yβ(T ))
d
dy
X(pi+yβ,θ)(T )
}
y∈(−δ,δ)
is P -uniformly integrable. Similarly, for all θ, η ∈ AΘ with η bounded, there exists
δ > 0 such that
θ + υη ∈ AΘ for all υ ∈ (−δ, δ)
and such that the family{∂f2
∂x
(t,X(pi,θ+υη)(t), pi, θ + υη, z)
d
dy
X(pi,θ+υη)(t)
+∇θf2(t,X(pi,θ+υη)(t), pi(t), θ + υη, z)η∗(t)
}
υ∈(−δ,δ)
is λ× ν × P -uniformly integrable and the family{
g′2(X
pi,θ+υη(T ))
d
dy
X(pi,θ+υη)(T )
}
υ∈(−δ,δ)
is P -uniformly integrable.
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(3.4) For all pi, β ∈ AΠ and θ, η ∈ AΘ with β, η bounded the processes Y (t) = Y (β)(t) =
d
dy
X(pi+yβ,θ)(t)|y=0, V (t) = V (η)(t) = ddυX(pi,θ+υη)(t)|υ=0 exist and satisfy the following
equations, respectively:
dY (t) = Y (t−)
[ ∂b
∂x
(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t))dt+
∂σ
∂x
(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t))dB(t)
+
∫
R0
∂γ
∂x
(t,X(t−), pi0(t−), pi1(t−, z), θ0(t−), θ1(t−, z), z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
+ β∗(t−)
[
∇pib(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t))dt+∇piσ(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t))dB(t)
+
∫
R0
∇piγ(t,X(t−), pi0(t−), pi1(t−, z), θ0(t−), θ1(t−), z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
;
Y (0) = 0,
and
dV (t) = V (t−)
[ ∂b
∂x
(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t))dt+
∂σ
∂x
(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t))dB(t)
+
∫
R0
∂γ
∂x
(t,X(t−), pi0(t−), pi1(t−, z), θ0(t−), θ1(t−, z), z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
+ η∗(t−)
[
∇θb(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t))dt+∇θσ(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t))dB(t)
+
∫
R0
∇θγ(t,X(t−), pi0(t−), pi1(t−, z), θ0(t−), θ1(t−, z), z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
;
V (0) = 0.
(3.5) For all pi ∈ AΠ and θ ∈ AΘ the following processes
Ki(t) := g
′
i(X(T )) +
∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂fi
∂x
(s,X(s), pi, θ, z1)µ(dz1)ds,
DtKi(t) := Dtg
′
i(X(T )) +
∫ T
t
∫
R0
Dt
∂fi
∂x
(s,X(s), pi, θ, z1)µ(dz1)ds,
Dt,zKi(t) := Dt,zg
′
i(X(T )) +
∫ T
t
∫
R0
Dt,z
∂fi
∂x
(s,X(s), pi, θ, z1)µ(dz1)ds,
H0i (s, x, pi, θ) := Ki(s)b(s, x, pi0, θ0) +DsKi(s)σ(s, x, pi0, θ0)
+
∫
R0
Ds,zKi(s)γ(s, x, pi, θ, z)ν(dz),
G(t, s) := exp
(∫ s
t
{ ∂b
∂x
(r,X(r), pi0(r), θ0(r))− 1
2
(∂σ
∂x
)2
(r,X(r), pi0(r), θ0(r))
}
dr
+
∫ s
t
∂σ
∂x
(r,X(r), pi0(r), θ0(r))dB(r)
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(r,X(r−), pi(r−, z), θ(r−, z), z)
)
N˜(dr, dz)
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+∫ s
t
∫
R0
{
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(r,X(r), pi, θ, z)
)
− ∂γ
∂x
(r,X(r), pi, θ, z)
}
ν(dz)dr
)
;
pi(t) := Ki(t) +
∫ T
t
∂H0i
∂x
(s,X(s), pi0(s), pi1(s, z), θ0(s), θ1(s, z))G(t, s)ds,
(3.6)
qi(t) := Dtpi(t) , and
(3.7)
ri(t, z) := Dt,zpi(t)
(3.8)
all exist for i = 1, 2, 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T, z1, z ∈ R0.
We now define the Hamiltonian for this general problem:
Definition 3.2 (The general stochastic Hamiltonian) The general stochastic Hamil-
tonians for the stochastic differential game in Problem 1.1 are the functions
Hi(t, x, pi, θ, ω) : [0, T ]× R× U ×K × Ω→ R, i = 1, 2
defined by
Hi(t, x, pi, θ, ω) =
∫
R0
fi(t, x, pi, θ, z, ω)µ(dz) + pi(t)b(t, x, pi0, θ0, ω) + qi(t)σ(t, x, pi0, θ0, ω)
+
∫
R0
ri(t, z)γ(t, x, pi, θ, z, ω)ν(dz), i = 1, 2(3.9)
where pi = (pi0, pi1) and θ = (θ0, θ1).
Remark 3.3 In the classical Markovian case, the Hamiltonian H∗i : [0, T ] × R × U ×K ×
R× R×R → R is defined by
H∗i (t, x, pi, θ, p, q, r) =
∫
R0
fi(t, x, pi, θ)µ(dz) + pi b(t, x, pi0, θ0) + qi σ(t, x, pi0, θ0)(3.10)
+
∫
R0
ri(t, z)γ(t, x, pi, θ, z)ν(dz),
where R is the set of functions ri : R×R0 → R; i = 1, 2 see [FØS]. Thus the relation between
H∗i and Hi is that:
(3.11) Hi(t, x, pi, θ, ω) = H
∗
i (t, x, pi, θ, p(t), q(t), r(t, ·)), i = 1, 2
where p(·), q(·) and r(·, ·) are given by (3.6)–(3.8).
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We can now formulate our general stochastic maximum principle for zero-sum games:
Theorem 3.4 (Maximum principle for non-zero-sum games)
(i) Suppose (pˆi, θˆ) ∈ AΠ ×AΘ is a Nash equilibrium, i.e.
(i) J1(pi, θˆ) ≤ J1(pˆi, θˆ) for all pi ∈ AΠ
and
(ii) J2(pˆi, θ) ≤ J2(pˆi, θˆ) for all θ ∈ AΘ.
Then
(3.12) Ex[∇piHˆ1(t,X(pi,θˆ)(t), pi, θˆ, ω)|pi=pˆi |Et] = 0,
and
(3.13) Ex[∇θHˆ2(t,X(pˆi,θ)(t), pˆi, θ, ω)|θ=θˆ |Et] = 0 for a.a. t, ω,
where
Xˆ(t) = X(pˆi,θˆ)(t),
Hˆi(t, Xˆ(t), pi, θ) =
∫
R0
fi(t, Xˆ(t), pi, θ, z)µ(dz) + pˆi(t)b(t, Xˆ(t), pi0, θ0) + qˆi(t)σ(t, Xˆ(t), pi0, θ0)
+
∫
R0
rˆi(t, z)γ(t, Xˆ(t
−), pi, θ, z)ν(dz),
with
pˆi(t) = Kˆi(t) +
∫ T
t
∂Hˆ0i
∂x
(s, Xˆ(s), pˆi(s), θˆ(s)) Gˆ(t, s)ds,
Kˆi(t) = K
(pˆi,θˆ)
i (t) = g
′
i(Xˆ(T )) +
∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂fi
∂x
(s, Xˆ(s), pˆi(s, z), θˆ(s, z), z)µ(dz)ds,
Hˆ0i (s, Xˆ, pˆi, θˆ) = Kˆi(s)b(s, Xˆ, pˆi0, θˆ0)+DsKˆi(s)σ(s, Xˆ, pˆi0, θˆ0)+
∫
R0
Ds,zKˆi(s)γ(s, Xˆ, pˆi, θˆ, z)ν(dz),
Gˆ(t, s) := exp
(∫ s
t
{ ∂b
∂x
(r, Xˆ(r), pˆi0(r), θˆ0(r))− 1
2
(∂σ
∂x
)2
(r, Xˆ(r), pˆi0(r), θˆ0(r))
}
dr
+
∫ s
t
∂σ
∂x
(r, Xˆ(r), pˆi0(r), θˆ0(r))dB(r)
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(r, Xˆ(r−), pˆi(r−, z), θˆ(r−, z), z)
)
N˜(dr, dz)
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
{
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(r, Xˆ(r), pˆi, θˆ, z)
)
− ∂γ
∂x
(r, Xˆ(r), pˆi, θˆ, z)
}
ν(dz)dr
)
;
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(3.14)
qˆi(t) := Dtpˆi(t),
and
rˆi(t, z) := Dt,zpˆi(t),
for i = 1, 2.
(ii) Conversely, suppose that there exists (pˆi, θˆ) ∈ AΠ × AΘ such that (3.12) and (3.13)
hold. Then
∂
∂y
J1(pˆi + yβ, θˆ) |y=0= 0 for all β,
∂
∂υ
J2(pˆi, θˆ + υη) |υ=0= 0 for all η.
In particular, if
pi → J1(pi, θˆ)
and
θ → J2(pˆi, θ) are concave,
then (pˆi, θˆ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof.
(i) Suppose (pˆi, θˆ) ∈ AΠ ×AΘ is a Nash equilibrium. Since (i) and (ii) hold for all pi and
θ, (pˆi, θˆ) is a directional critical point for Ji(pi, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all
bounded β ∈ AΠ and η ∈ AΘ, there exists δ > 0 such that pˆi + yβ ∈ AΠ, θˆ + υη ∈ AΘ
for all y, υ ∈ (−δ, δ). Then we have
(3.15)
0 = ∂
∂y
J1(pˆi + yβ, θˆ)|y=0
= Ex
[ ∫ T
0
∫
R0{
∂f1
∂x
(t, Xˆ(t), pˆi0(t), pˆi1(t, z), θˆ0(t), θˆ1(t, z), z)
d
dy
X(pˆi+yβ,θˆ)(t)|y=0
+∇pif1(t,X(pi,θˆ)(t), pi0(t), pi1(t, z), θˆ0(t), θˆ1(t, z), z)|pi=pˆiβ∗(t)}µ(dz)dt
+g′1(Xˆ(T ))
d
dy
X(pˆi+yβ,θˆ)(T )|y=0
]
= Ex
[ ∫ T
0
∫
R0{
∂f1
∂x
(t, Xˆ(t), pˆi0(t), pˆi1(t, z), θˆ0(t), θˆ1(t, z), z)Y (t)
+∇pif1(t,X(pi,θˆ)(t), pi0(t), pi1(t, z), θˆ0(t), θˆ1(t, z), z)|pi=pˆiβ∗(t)}µ(dz)dt+ g′1(Xˆ(T ))Y (T )
]
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where
(3.16)
Y (t) = Y (β)(t) = d
dy
X(pˆi+yβ,θˆ)(t)|y=0
=
∫ t
0
{ ∂b
∂x
(s, Xˆ(s), pˆi0(s), θˆ0(s))Y (s) +∇pib(s,X(pi,θˆ)(s), pi0(s), θˆ0(s))|pi=pˆiβ∗(s)}ds
+
∫ t
0
{∂σ
∂x
(s, Xˆ(s), pˆi0(s), θˆ0(s))Y (s) +∇piσ(s,X(pi,θˆ)(s), pi0(s), θˆ0(s))|pi=pˆiβ∗(s)}dB(s)
+
∫ t
0
∫
R0{
∂γ
∂x
(s, Xˆ(s−), pˆi(s−), θˆ(s−), z)Y (s)
+∇piγ(s,X(pi,θˆ)(s−), pi(s−), θˆ(s−), z)|pi=pˆiβ∗(s)}N˜(ds, dz).
If we use the short hand notation
∂f1
∂x
(t, Xˆ(t), pˆi, θˆ, z) =
∂f1
∂x
(t, z), ∇pif1(t,X(pi,θˆ)(t), pi, θˆ, z)|pi=pˆi = ∇pif1(t, z)
and similarly for ∂b
∂x
,∇pib, ∂σ∂x ,∇piσ, ∂γ∂x and ∇piγ, we can write
(3.17)
dY (t) = { ∂b
∂x
(t)Y (t) +∇pib(t)β∗(t)}dt+ {∂σ∂x (t)Y (t) +∇piσ(t)β∗(t)}dB(t)
+
∫
R0{
∂γ
∂x
(t)Y (t) +∇piγ(t, z)β∗(t)}N˜(dt, dz);
Y (0) = 0.
By the duality formulas (2.9) and (2.18) and the Fubini theorem, we get
(3.18)
Ex
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)Y (t)µ(dz)dt
]
= Ex
[ ∫ T
0
∫
R0
( ∫ t
0
{
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)[ ∂b
∂x
(s)Y (s) +∇pib(s)β∗(s)]
+Ds
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)[∂σ
∂x
(s)Y (s) +∇piσ(s)β∗(s)]
+
∫
R0 Ds,z1
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)[∂γ
∂x
(s, z1)Y (s) +∇piγ(s, z1)β∗(s)]
ν(dz1)
}
ds
)
µ(dz)dt
]
= Ex
[ ∫ T
0
{
(
∫ T
s
∫
R0
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)µ(dz)dt)[ ∂b
∂x
Y (s) +∇pib(s)β∗(s)]
+(
∫ T
s
∫
R0 Ds
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)µ(dz)dt)[∂σ
∂x
Y (s) +∇piσβ∗(s)]
+
∫
R0(
∫ T
s
∫
R0 Ds,z1
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)µ(dz)dt)[∂γ
∂x
Y (s) +∇piγβ∗(s)]
ν(dz1)
}
ds
]
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Changing notation s→ t and z1 → z this becomes
(3.19)
Ex
[ ∫ T
0
∫
R0
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)Y (t)µ(dz)dt
]
= Ex
[ ∫ T
0
{
(
∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂f1
∂x
(s, z1)µ(dz1)ds)
[ ∂b
∂x
(t)Y (t) +∇pib(t)β∗(t)]
+(
∫ T
t
∫
R0 Dt
∂f1
∂x
(s, z1)µ(dz1)ds)[
∂σ
∂x
(t)Y (t) +∇piσ(t)β∗(t)]
+
∫
R0(
∫ T
t
∫
R0 Dt,z
∂f1
∂x
(s, z1)µ(dz1)ds)[
∂γ
∂x
(t, z)Y (t)
+∇piγ(t, z)β∗(t)]ν(dz)
}
dt
]
.
On the other hand, by the duality formulas (2.9) and (2.18), we get
Ex
[
g′1(Xˆ(T ))Y (T )
]
= Ex
[
g′1(Xˆ(T ))
( ∫ T
0
{ ∂b
∂x
(t)Y (t) +∇pib(t)β∗(t)}dt
+
∫ T
0
{∂σ
∂x
(t)Y (t) +∇piσ(t)β∗(t)}dB(t)
+
∫ T
0
∫
R0{
∂γ
∂x
(t, z)Y (t) +∇piγ(t, z)β(t)}N˜(dt, dz)
)]
= Ex
[ ∫ T
0
{
g′1(Xˆ(T ))
∂b
∂x
(t)Y (t) + g′1(Xˆ(T ))∇pib(t)β∗(t)
+Dt(g
′
1(Xˆ(T )))
∂σ
∂x
(t)Y (t) +Dt(g
′
1(Xˆ(T )))∇piσ(t)β∗(t)
+
∫
R0 [Dt,z(g
′
1(Xˆ(T )))
∂γ
∂x
(t, z)Y (t)
+Dt,z(g
′
1(Xˆ(T )))∇piγ(t, z)β∗(t)]ν(dz)
}
dt
]
.
Recall
(3.20) K1(t) := g
′
1(X(T )) +
∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂f1
∂x
(s, z1)µ(dz1) ds,
so
Kˆ1(t) := g
′
1(Xˆ(T )) +
∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂f1
∂x
(s, z1)µ(dz1) ds.
By combining (3.17)–(3.19), we get
(3.21)
Ex
[ ∫ T
0
{
Kˆ1(t)(
∂b
∂x
(t)Y (t) +∇pib(t)β∗(t)) +DtKˆ1(t)(∂σ∂x (t)Y (t) +∇piσ(t)β∗(t))
+
∫
R0 Dt,zKˆ1(t)(
∂γ
∂x
(t, z)Y (t) +∇piγ(t, z)β∗(t))ν(dz)
+
∫
R0 ∇pif1(t, z)β∗(t)µ(dz)
}
dt
]
= 0.
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Now apply this to β = βα ∈ AΠ of the form βα(s) = αχ[t,t+h](s), for some t, h ∈ (0, T ),
t + h ≤ T , where α = α(ω) is bounded and Et-measurable. Then Y (βα)(s) = 0 for
0 ≤ s ≤ t and hence (3.21) becomes
(3.22) A1 + A2 = 0,
where
A1 = E
x
[ ∫ T
t
{Kˆ1(s) ∂b
∂x
(s) +DsKˆ1(s)
∂σ
∂x
(s) +
∫
R0
Ds,zKˆ1(s)
∂γ
∂x
(s)ν(dz)}Y (βα)(s)ds
]
,
A2 = E
x
[
(
∫ t+h
t
{
Kˆ1(s)∇pib(s) +DsKˆ1(s)∇piσ(s) +
∫
R0 Ds,zKˆ1(s)∇piγ(s, z)ν(dz)
+
∫
R0 ∇pif1(s, z)µ(dz)
}
ds)α
]
.
Note that, by (3.16), with Y (s) = Y (βα)(s) and s ≥ t+ h,
dY (s) = Y (s−)
{ ∂b
∂x
(s)ds+
∂σ
∂x
(s)dB(s) +
∫
R0
∂γ
∂x
(s−, z)N˜(ds, dz)
}
,
for s ≥ t+ h. Hence by the Itoˆ formula,
(3.23) Y (s) = Y (t+ h)G(t+ h, s); s ≥ t+ h,
where, in general, for s ≥ t,
G(t, s) = exp
(∫ s
t
{ ∂b
∂x
(r)− 1
2
(∂σ
∂x
)2
(r)
}
dr +
∫ s
t
∂σ
∂x
(r)dB(r)
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(r−, z)
)
N˜(dr, dz)
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
{
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(r, z)
)
− ∂γ
∂x
(r, z)
}
ν(dz)dr
)
.(3.24)
Note that G(t, s) does not depend on h. Put
(3.25)
H01 (s, x, pi, θ) = K1(s)b(s, x, pi0, θ0)+DsK1(s)σ(s, x, pi0, θ0)+
∫
R0
Ds,zK1(s)γ(s, x, pi, θ, z)ν(dz),
and Hˆ01 (s) = H
0
1 (s, Xˆ(s), pˆi, θˆ). Then
A1 = E
x
[ ∫ T
t
∂Hˆ01
∂x
(s)Y (s)ds
]
.
Differentiating with respect to h at h = 0 we get
(3.26)
d
dh
A1
∣∣
h=0
=
d
dh
Ex
[ ∫ t+h
t
∂Hˆ01
∂x
(s)Y (s)ds
]
h=0
+
d
dh
Ex
[ ∫ T
t+h
∂Hˆ01
∂x
(s)Y (s)ds
]
h=0
.
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Since Y (t) = 0 we see that
(3.27)
d
dh
Ex
[ ∫ t+h
t
∂Hˆ01
∂x
(s)Y (s)ds
]
h=0
= 0.
Therefore, by (3.22),
d
dh
A1
∣∣
h=0
=
d
dh
Ex
[ ∫ T
t+h
∂Hˆ01
∂x
(s)Y (t+ h)G(t+ h, s)ds
]
h=0
=
∫ T
t
d
dh
Ex
[∂Hˆ01
∂x
(s)Y (t+ h)G(t+ h, s)
]
h=0
ds
=
∫ T
t
d
dh
Ex
[∂Hˆ01
∂x
(s)G(t, s)Y (t+ h)
]
h=0
ds.(3.28)
By (3.16)
Y (t+ h) = α
∫ t+h
t
{
∇pib(r)dr +∇piσdB(r) +
∫
R0
∇piγ(r−, z)N˜(dr, dz)
}
+
∫ t+h
t
Y (r−)
{ ∂b
∂x
(r)dr +
∂σ
∂x
(r)dB(r) +
∫
R0
∂γ
∂x
(r−, z)N˜(dr, dz)
}
.(3.29)
Therefore, by (3.27) and (3.28),
(3.30)
d
dh
A1
∣∣
h=0
= Λ1 + Λ2,
where
Λ1 =
∫ T
t
d
dh
Ex
[∂Hˆ01
∂x
(s)G(t, s)α
∫ t+h
t
{
∇pib(r)dr +∇piσ(r)dB(r)
+
∫
R0
∇piγ(r−, z)N˜(dr, dz)
}]
h=0
ds(3.31)
and
Λ2 =
∫ T
t
d
dh
Ex
[∂Hˆ01
∂x
(s)G(t, s)
∫ t+h
t
Y (r−)
{ ∂b
∂x
(r)dr +
∂σ
∂x
(r)dB(r)
+
∫
R0
∂γ
∂x
(r−, z)N˜(dr, dz)
}]
h=0
ds.(3.32)
By the duality formulae (2.9), (2.18) we have
Λ1 =
∫ T
t
d
dh
Ex
[
α
∫ t+h
t
{
∇pib(r)F1(t, s) +∇piσ(r)DrF1(t, s)
+
∫
R0
∇piγ(r, z)Dr,zF1(t, s)ν(dz)
}
dr
]
h=0
ds
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=∫ T
t
Ex
[
α
{
∇pib(t)F1(t, s) +∇piσ(t)DtF1(t, s) +
∫
R0
∇piγ(t, z)Dt,zF1(t, s)ν(dz)
}]
ds,
(3.33)
where we have put
(3.34) F1(t, s) =
∂Hˆ01
∂x
(s)G(t, s).
Since Y (t) = 0 we see that
(3.35) Λ2 = 0.
We conclude that
d
dh
A1
∣∣
h=0
= Λ1
=
∫ T
t
Ex
[
α
{
F1(t, s)∇pib(t) +DtF1(t, s)∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt,zF1(t, s)∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
}]
ds.
(3.36)
Moreover, we see directly that
d
dh
A2
∣∣
h=0
= Ex
[
α
{
Kˆ1(t)∇pib(t)+DtKˆ1(t)∇piσ(t)+
∫
R0
{Dt,zKˆ1(t)∇piγ(t, z)+∇pif1(t, z)}ν(dz)
}]
.
Therefore, differentiating (3.21) with respect to h at h = 0 gives the equation
Ex
[
α
{(
Kˆ1(t) +
∫ T
t
F1(t, s)ds
)
∇pib(t) +Dt
(
Kˆ1(t) +
∫ T
t
F1(t, s)ds
)
∇piσ(t)
+
∫
R0
Dt,z
(
Kˆ1(t) +
∫ T
t
F1(t, s)ds
)
∇piγ(t, z) +∇pif1(t, z)ν(dz)
}]
= 0.(3.37)
We can reformulate this as follows: If we define, as in (3.6),
(3.38) pˆ1(t) = Kˆ1(t) +
∫ T
t
F1(t, s)ds = Kˆ1(t) +
∫ T
t
∂Hˆ01
∂x
(s)G(t, s)ds,
then (3.36) can be written
Ex
[
∇pi
{∫
R0
f1(t, Xˆ(t), pi, θˆ, z)µ(dz) + pˆ1(t)b(t, Xˆ(t), pi0, θˆ0) +Dtpˆ1(t)σ(t, Xˆ(t), pi0, θˆ0)
+
∫
R0
Dt,zpˆ1(t)γ(t, Xˆ(t), pi, θˆ, z)ν(dz)
}
pi=(pi0(t),pi1(t,z))
α
]
= 0.
Since this holds for all bounded Et-measurable random variable α, we conclude that
Ex
[
∇piHˆ1(t,X(pi,θˆ)(t), pi, θˆ) |pi=pˆi(t)| Et
]
= 0.
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Similarly, we have
(3.39)
0 = ∂
∂υ
J2(pˆi, θˆ + υη)|υ=0
= Ex
[ ∫ T
0
∫
R0{
∂f2
∂x
(t,X(pˆi,θ)(t), pˆi(t, z), θˆ(t, z), z)D(t)
+∇θf2(t,X(pˆi,θ)(t), pˆi(t, z), θ(t, z), z)|θ=θˆη(t)}µ(dz)dt+ g′2(Xˆ(T ))D(T )
]
where
(3.40)
D(t) = D(η)(t) = d
dυ
X(pˆi,θˆ+υη)(t)|υ=0
=
∫ t
0
{ ∂b
∂x
(s, Xˆ(s), pˆi0(s), θˆ0(s))D(s) +∇θb(s,X(pˆi0,θ0)(s), pˆi0(s), θ0(s))|θ=θˆη∗(s)}ds
+
∫ t
0
{∂σ
∂x
(s, Xˆ(s), pˆi0(s), θˆ0(s))Y (s) +∇θσ(s,X(pˆi,θ)(s), pˆi0(s), θ0(s))|θ=θˆη∗(s)}dB(s)
+
∫ t
0
∫
R0{
∂γ
∂x
(s, Xˆ(s−), pˆi(s−, z), θˆ(s−), z)D(s)
+∇θγ(s,X(pˆi,θ)(s−), pˆi(s−, z), θ(s−, z), z)|θ=θˆη∗(s)}N˜(ds, dz).
Define
D(s) = D(t+ h)G(t+ h, s); s ≥ t+ h,
where Gˆ(t, s) is defined as in (3.23). By using similar arguments, we get
Ex
[
∇θHˆ2(t,X(pˆi,θ)(t), pˆi, θ) |θ=θˆ(t)| Et
]
= 0.
This completes the proof of (i).
(ii) Conversely, suppose that there exists (pˆi, θˆ) ∈ AΠ×AΘ such that (3.12) and (3.13) hold.
Then by reversing the above arguments, we obtain that (3.22)holds for all βα(s, ω) =
α(ω)χ(t,t+h](s) ∈ AΠ, where
A1 = E
x
[ ∫ T
t
{Kˆ1(s) ∂b
∂x
(s) +DsKˆ1(s)
∂σ
∂x
(s) +
∫
R0
Ds,zKˆ1(s)
∂γ
∂x
(s)ν(dz)}Y (βα)(s)ds
]
,
A2 = E
x
[
(
∫ t+h
t
{
Kˆ1(s)∇pib(s) +DsKˆ1(s)∇piσ(s) +
∫
R0 Ds,zKˆ1(s)∇piγ(s, z)ν(dz)
+
∫
R0 ∇pif1(s, z)µ(dz)
}
ds)α
]
,
for some t, h ∈ [0, T ] with t+ h ≤ T and some bounded Et- measurable α. Similarly,
(3.41) A3 + A4 = 0
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for all ηξ(s, ω) = ξ(ω)χ(t,t+h](s) ∈ AΘ, where
A3 = E
x
[ ∫ T
t
{Kˆ2(s) ∂b
∂x
(s) +DsKˆ2(s)
∂σ
∂x
(s) +
∫
R0
Ds,zKˆ2(s)
∂γ
∂x
(s)ν(dz)}Y (ηξ)(s)ds
]
,
A4 = E
x
[
(
∫ t+h
t
{
Kˆ2(s)∇θb(s) +DsKˆ2(s)∇θσ(s) +
∫
R0 Ds,zKˆ2(s)∇θγ(s, z)ν(dz)
+
∫
R0 ∇θf2(s, z)µ(dz)
}
ds)α
]
,
for some t, h ∈ [0, T ] with t+h ≤ T and some bounded Et- measurable ξ. Hence, these
equalities hold for all linear combinations of βα and ηξ. Since all bounded β ∈ AΠ and
η ∈ AΘ can be approximated pointwise boundedly in (t, ω) by such linear combinations,
it follows that (3.22) and (3.41) hold for all bounded (β, η) ∈ AΠ × AΘ. Hence, by
reversing the remaining part of the proof above, we conclude that
∂
∂y
J1(pˆi + yβ, θˆ) |y=0= 0,
∂
∂υ
J2(pˆi, θˆ + υη) |υ=0= 0 for all β and η.

4 Zero-sum games
Suppose that the given performance functional of Player I is the negative of the Player II,
i.e.:
(4.1)
J1(u0, u1) = E
x
[ ∫ T
0
∫
R0
f(t,X(t), u0(t), u1(t, z), z, ω)µ(dz)dt+ g(X(T ), ω)
]
= −J2(u0, u1),
where Ex = ExP denotes the expectation with respect to P given that X(0) = x. Suppose
that the controls u0(t) and u1(t, z) have the form as in the (1.5) and (1.6). Let AΠ and AΘ
denote the given family of controls pi = (pi0, pi1) and θ = (θ0, θ1) such that they are contained
in the set of Et-adapted controls, (1.1) has a unique strong solution up to time T and
(4.2) Ex
[ ∫ T
0
∫
R0
|f(t,X(t), pi0(t), pi1(t, z), θ0(t), θ1(t, z), z, ω)|µ(dz)dt+ |g(X(T ), ω)|
]
<∞.
Then the partial information zero-sum stochastic differential game problem is the following:
Problem 4.1 Find ΦE ∈ R, pi∗ ∈ AΠ and θ∗ ∈ AΘ (if it exists) such that
(4.3) ΦE = inf
θ∈AΘ
( sup
pi∈AΠ
J(pi, θ)) = J(pi∗, θ∗) = sup
pi∈AΠ
( inf
θ∈AΘ
J(pi, θ)).
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Such a control (pi∗, θ∗) is called an optimal control (if it exists). The intuitive idea is that
while Player I controls pi, Player II controls θ. The actions of the players are antagonistic,
which means that between Player I and II there is a payoff J(pi, θ) which is a reward for
Player I and a cost for Player II. Note that since we allow b, σ, γ, f and g to be stochastic
processes and also because our controls are Et−adapted, this problem is not of Markovian
type and hence cannot be solved by dynamic programming.
Theorem 4.2 (Maximum principle for zero-sum games)
(i) Suppose (pˆi, θˆ) ∈ AΠ×AΘ is a directional critical point for J(pi, θ), in the sense that for
all bounded β ∈ AΠ and η ∈ AΘ, there exists δ > 0 such that pˆi+yβ ∈ AΠ, θˆ+υη ∈ AΘ
for all y, υ ∈ (−δ, δ) and
c(y, υ) := J(pˆi + yβ, θˆ + υη), y, υ ∈ (−δ, δ)
has a critical point at 0, i.e.,
(4.4)
∂c
∂y
(0, 0) =
∂c
∂υ
(0, 0) = 0.
Then
(4.5) Ex[∇piHˆ(t,X(pi,θˆ)(t), pi, θˆ, ω)|Et]pi=pˆi = 0,
(4.6) Ex[∇θHˆ(t,X(pˆi,θ)(t), pˆi, θ, ω)|Et]θ=θˆ = 0 for a.a. t, ω,
where
Xˆ(t) = X(pˆi,θˆ)(t),
Hˆ(t, Xˆ(t), pi, θ) =
∫
R0
f(t, Xˆ(t), pi, θ, z)µ(dz) + pˆ(t)b(t, Xˆ(t), pi0, θ0) + qˆ(t)σ(t, Xˆ(t), pi0, θ0)
+
∫
R0
rˆ(t, z)γ(t, Xˆ(t−), pi, θ, z)ν(dz),(4.7)
with
(4.8) pˆ(t) = Kˆ(t) +
∫ T
t
∂H0
∂x
(s, Xˆ(s), pˆi(s), θˆ(s)) Gˆ(t, s)ds,
(4.9) Kˆ(t) = K(pˆi,θˆ)(t) = g′(Xˆ(T )) +
∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂f
∂x
(s, Xˆ(s), pˆi(s, z), θˆ(s, z), z)µ(dz)ds,
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(4.10)
Hˆ0(s, Xˆ, pˆi, θˆ) = Kˆ(s)b(s, Xˆ, pˆi0, θˆ0)+DsKˆ(s)σ(s, Xˆ, pˆi0, θˆ0)+
∫
R0
Ds,zKˆ(s)γ(s, Xˆ, pˆi, θˆ, z)ν(dz),
Gˆ(t, s) := exp
(∫ s
t
{ ∂b
∂x
(r, Xˆ(r), pˆi0(r), θˆ0(r))− 1
2
(∂σ
∂x
)2
(r, Xˆ(r), pˆi0(r), θˆ0(r))
}
dr
+
∫ s
t
∂σ
∂x
(r, Xˆ(r), pˆi0(r), θˆ0(r))dB(r)
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(r, Xˆ(r−), pˆi(r−, z), θˆ(r−, z), z)
)
N˜(dr, dz)
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
{
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(r, Xˆ(r), pˆi, θˆ, z)
)
− ∂γ
∂x
(r, Xˆ(r), pˆi, θˆ, z)
}
ν(dz)dr
)
;
(4.11)
qˆ(t) := Dtpˆ(t),
and
rˆ(t, z) := Dt,zpˆ(t).
(ii) Conversely, suppose that there exists (pˆi, θˆ) ∈ AΠ ×AΘ such that (4.5) and (4.6) hold.
Then (pˆi, θˆ) satisfies (4.4).
5 Application: Worst case scenario optimal portfolio
under partial information
We illustrate the results in the previous section by looking at an application to robust
portfolio choice in finance:
Consider a financial market with the following two investment possibilities:
(i) A risk free asset, where the unit price S0(t) at time t is
dS0(t) = r(t)S0(t)dt; S0(0) = 1; 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where T > 0 is a given constant.
(ii) A risky asset, where the unit price S1(t) at time t is given by
(5.1)

dS1(t) = S1(t
−)[θ(t)dt+ σ0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R0γ0(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)],
S1(0) > 0,
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where r, θ, σ0, γ0 are predictable processes such that∫ T
0
{| θ(s) | +σ20(s) +
∫
R0
γ20(s, z)ν(dz)}ds <∞ a.s.
We assume that θ is adapted to a given subfiltration Et and that
γ0(t, z, ω) ≥ −1 + δ for all t, z, ω ∈ [0, T ]× R0 × Ω
for some constant δ > 0.
Let pi(t) = pi(t, ω) be a portfolio, representing the amount invested in the risky asset at time
t. We require that pi be Et-predictable and self-financing, and hence that the corresponding
wealth X(t) = X(pi,θ)(t) at time t is given by
(5.2)

dX(t) = [X(t)− pi(t)]r(t)dt+ pi(t)[θ(t)dt+ σ0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R0γ0(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)]
X(0) = x > 0.
Let us assume that the mean relative growth rate θ(t) of the risky asset is not known to the
trader, but subject to uncertainty. We may regard θ as a market scenario or a stochastic
control of the market, which is playing against the trader. Let A εΠ and A
ε
Θ denote the set of
admissible controls pi, θ, respectively. The worst case partial information scenario optimal
problem for the trader is to find pi∗ ∈ A εΠ and θ∗ ∈ A εΘ and Φ ∈ R such that
Φ = inf
θ∈A εΘ
( sup
pi∈A εΠ
E[U(X(pi,θ)(T ))])
= E[U(X(pi
∗,θ∗)(T ))],(5.3)
where U : [0,∞)→ R is a given utility function, assumed to be concave, strictly increasing
and C1 on (0,∞). We want to study this problem by using Theorem 4.2. In this case we
have
(5.4) b(t, x, pi, θ) = pi(θ − r(t)) + xr(t), K(t) = U ′(X(pi,θ)(T ))
H0(t, x, pi, θ) = U
′
(X(pi,θ)(T ))[pi(θ − r(t)) + xr(t)](5.5)
+Dt(U
′
(X(pi,θ)(T )))piσ0(t) +
∫
R0
Dt,z(U
′
(X(pi,θ)(T )))piγ(t, z)ν(dz),
and
p(t) = U
′
(X(pi,θ)(T ))[1 +
∫ T
t
r(s)G(t, s)ds],
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where
G(t, s) = exp(
∫ s
t
r(v)dv).
Hence, ∫ T
t
r(s)G(t, s)ds =
∣∣T
t
exp(
∫ s
t
r(v)dv) = exp(
∫ T
t
r(v)dv)− 1
and
(5.6) p(t) = U
′
(X(pi,θ)(T )) exp(
∫ T
t
r(s)ds).
With this value for p(t) we have
H(t,X(pi,θ)(t), pi, θ) = p(t)[pi(θ − r(t)) + r(t)X(t)]
+Dtp(t)piσ0(t) +
∫
R0
Dt,zp(t)piγ0(t, z)ν(dz).(5.7)
Hence equation (4.5) becomes
E[
∂H
∂pi
(t, Xˆ(t), pi, θˆ) | Et]pi=pˆi(t)
= E[p(t)(θˆ − r(t)) +Dtp(t)σ0(t) +
∫
R0
Dt,zp(t)γ0(t, z)ν(dz) | Et] = 0(5.8)
and equation (4.6) becomes
E[
∂H
∂θ
(t, Xˆ(t), pˆi, θ) | Et]θ=θˆ(t)
= E[p(t)pˆi | Et] = E[p(t) | Et]pˆi(t) = 0.(5.9)
Since p(t) > 0 we conclude that
(5.10) pˆi(t) = 0.
This implies that
(5.11) Xˆ(t) = x exp(
∫ t
0
r(s)ds)
and
(5.12) pˆ(t) = U
′
(
x exp(
∫ T
0
r(s)ds)
)
exp(
∫ T
t
r(s)ds); t ∈ [0, T ].
Hence pˆ(t) is known, and by (5.8) we get
(5.13) θˆ(t) =
E
[
pˆ(t)r(t)−Dtpˆ(t)σ0(t)−
∫
R0 Dt,zpˆ(t)γ0(t, z)ν(dz) | Et
]
E[pˆ(t) | Et] .
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By Theorem 4.2 we conclude that (pˆi, θˆ) given by (5.10) and (5.13) is the unique critical
point of
J(pi, θ) = E[U(X(pi,θ)(T ))]; (pi, θ) ∈ (A εΠ,A εΘ).
Thus we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 (Worst case scenario optimal portfolio under partial information)
Suppose there exists a solution (pi∗, θ∗) ∈ (A εΠ,A εΘ) of the stochastic differential game (5.3).
Then
(5.14) pi∗ = pˆi = 0 and θ∗ = θˆ is given by (5.13).
In particular, if r(s) is deterministic, then
(5.15) pi∗ = 0 and θ∗(t) = r(t).
Remark 5.2 (i) If r(s) is deterministic, then (5.15) states that the worst case scenario
is when θˆ(t) = r(t), for all t ∈ [0, T ], i.e. when the normalized risky asset price
e−
R t
0 r(s)dsS1(t)
is a martingale. In such a situation the trader might as well put all her money in the
risk free asset, i.e. choose pi(t) = pˆi(t) = 0. This trading strategy remain optimal if
r(s) is not deterministic, but now the worst case scenario θˆ(t) is given by the more
complicated expression (5.13).
(ii) This is a new approach to, and a partial extension of, Theorem 2.2 in [ØS2] and
Theorem 4.1 in the subsequent paper [AØ]. Both of these papers consider the case with
deterministic r(t) only. On the other hand, in these papers the scenario is represented
by a probability measure and not by the drift.
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